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WHAT DOES BAKKE REQUIRE OF LAW SCHOOLS?
THE SALT BOARD OF GOVERNORS STATEMENT

"

HOWARD LESNICK t

I. THE IssuEs FACING LAw SCHOOLS

The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke' has prompted
many law schools, and the universities of which they are parts, to
reexamine existing admissions criteria and procedures. Such reexaminations may raise considerations of educational policy, including issues of fairness and justice to the individuals and groups
affected by race-conscious admissions programs. They may also
involve the introduction of legal imperatives perceived to arise from
the Bakke decision itself. All too often, there is a tendency to
merge these very distinct inputs, and to seek refuge from the burden
of pursuing difficult and divisive issues of policy in an asserted
legal compulsion.
This essay does not undertake to reexamine the questions of
educational and social policy involved in the establishment or
structuring of particular admissions programs. The question it does
address is: What changes (if any) in minority-admissions programs
are university law schools now obliged to make to comply with the
Supreme Court's decision in Bakke-put another way, what forms
of programs are now placed beyond the discretion of individual
schools?
In examining this question, we should begin by clarifying
two conditioning factors. The first concerns the moral imperative
to obey the normative standards of the law (including the principle
that one should avoid encouraging litigation); the second is the
role of university counsel in guiding consideration of important
changes in an admissions program.
* This essay is a slightly revised version of a paper prepared by Professor

Lesnick for the Board of Governors of the Society of American Law Teachers and
adopted by it in January, 1979, as a statement of the Board. The Society of American Law Teachers is a membership organization of individual law teachers. It is
interested in questions concerning the capacity of the legal profession, as a public
profession, to serve societal needs, and in the relation between legal education and
the quality and availability of legal representation, including matters of professional
responsibility and greater equality of access to the legal profession and to legal
representation. It has worked to support the appropriate use of race-conscious
admissions criteria by law schools.
f Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1952, New York University; A.M. 1953, LL.M. 1958, Columbia University.
1438 U.S. 265 (1978).
(141)
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As lawyers and teachers of law, members of law school faculties
presumably accept, indeed espouse, an obligation to obey the law,
not only in the narrow sense of Justice Holmes's "bad man," but,
more broadly, to seek to conform their conduct to what they have
conscientiously determined to be the norms embodied in it. It is
essential, however, to recognize that this principle does not resolve
the question of interpretation of a difficult set of opinions such as
those produced by the Bakke litigation. It especially does not justify
what amounts to a rule of construction favoring an interpretation
giving the broadest tenable reach to every uncertain aspect of the
decision. Such an approach may or may not commend itself, but it
can claim no moral force: It is no more "ethical" or "responsible"
than a rule of narrow construction, as long as each is held in good
conscience and is objectively tenable.
Nor is the value afforded simple prudence and the related
desire to avoid litigation sufficient to justify an expansive reading
of Bakke without taking into account the seriousness of the educational objectives which might be sacrificed thereby. Law schools
reject many applicants for each accepted. The decision of the
Supreme Court of California, unreversed by the Supreme Court,
places on the school the burden of proving lack of any causal relation between a minority-admissions program and the rejection of a
particular applicant.2 Presumably, then, a rejected white applicant
wishing to assert a claim of unlawful "reverse discrimination" will
often be able to force a school to defend its admissions program
merely by showing that he had a higher admissions score than a
successful minority candidate. 3 Each school has dozens, perhaps
hundreds, of such potential plaintiffs each year. Moreover, it seems
clear that this will remain true no matter how a minority-admissions program is changed. While one might hope that the likelihood that potential plaintiffs will actually sue would be reduced by
the evident eagerness of a university to avoid legal challenge, no
one can confidently assert that such an effort would be totally successful. Thus, because universities will live with a substantial risk
of litigation no matter what they do, it would be fruitless to sacrifice
important educational objectives in the hope of escaping the threat
of suit.
2 Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 63-64, 553 P.2d 1152,
1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 700 (1976). In the Supreme Court, see Bakke, 438
U.S. at 280 n.13.
3 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277 & n.7, 280.
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In such a climate, and bearing in mind that many law teachers
feel a strong ethical obligation not to have too weak a minorityadmissions program, the strength of the case for particular changes
in a school's program will more often need to be made on the
basis of a contention that valued educational objectives will not be
impaired-that is, on considerations of policy, fairness, and equitythan on a desire to avoid litigation or the risk of legal liability.
Law schools are in a difficult position no matter how they act, for
their responses to the competing demands affecting the shape of a
minority-admissions program implicate the interests of many beside
themselves: minority and non-minority applicants and students, the
university as a whole, the legal profession, and the larger society.
For many of us, it is uncomfortable to be making decisions affecting
these interests. It is essential to recognize that there is no escape
from that discomfort. Any decision a law school makes has such an
impact, and the propriety of a particular decision within the range
of arguable differences over what the law requires must therefore
be ultimately justified on policy grounds. A school may choose to
narrow its program more than is required, but it would be tragic
for such a choice to be made on the basis of supposed moral or
legal imperatives grounded in a broader reading of Bakke than a
conscientious, fair-minded analysis requires.
In this connection, the role of university counsel is a critical
one, and law professors should be particularly advertent to that role.
The task most schools will face is not the shaping of a law suit or the
drafting of a brief in support of a program challenged in court.
It will be the more sensitive, less familiar one of a claimed need
to restructure an existing program to avoid litigation or a threat
of liability, or to carry out what is argued to be a morally required
course of action. Critical decisions narrowing a program might be
made by law school faculties or administrations or by university
administrations. The latter will often look to their counsel to
learn what their legal obligations are. Faculty members who believe that a particular program remains lawful, and that university
trustees or administrators should not insist on changes out of a
belief that they have no choice under the law, should be aware of
the hazards of seeking to persuade lay administrators or trustees of
the legal merit of a position contrary to that taken by their attorneys. Rather, attention should be paid to the advice-giving
process itself.
As an example, a faculty faced with the assertion that the administration has been advised that a particular program is now
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unlawful should insist that that advice be supported by a written
opinion of counsel. Such a course will often deter, and will at least
expose, advice based on nothing more than a reflexive preference for
the most cautious-that is, the broadest possible-reading of the decision. The critical vice in such a preference is that it overrides the
concerns of educational policy which are sacrificed by the particular
changes said to be mandated, not because a conscious policy choice
is made that the costs involved are not entitled to greater weight,
but because the issue is said to be removed from the policy arena.
Once the issue is perceived as one of educational policy, it becomes
clear that it is not the function of counsel to determine what weight
particular objectives should have. Specifically, it is not the role of
counsel to decide whether or not the setting of a particular numerical goal, the administration of a program by a particular form
of committee, or the input of specific policy objectives are important to the achievement of particular educational aims.
The question, what is removed from university discretion by
Bakke, is the subject of this essay. The discussion which follows
assumes that the reader is familiar with the litigation involving the
admissions program of the University of California Medical School
at Davis. It will be recalled that all of the Justices expressed views
with respect to the meaning of the statutory prohibition contained
in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 but only five spoke to
the meaning of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 The litigation produced two different five-Justice majorities, one to affirm the judgment that the Davis program was
unlawful and another to reverse the judgment that race may not be
a positive factor in determining relative admissibility.6 Justice
Powell was the only Justice in the majority on both dispositions.
Section II examines the question whether the mandate of Bakke is
442 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1977).
5

Justice Powell, who announced the judgment of the Court, held that Title VI
proscribed "only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection
Clause or the Fifth Amendment." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287. Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell: "Title VI goes no
further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ......
Id. 325. Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, held that Title VI was
not limited by the substantive reach of the fourteenth amendment, id. 416-18, and
that the medical school's minority-admissions program violated Title VI, id. 421.
The Stevens Four declined to reach the constitutional issue, id. 411-12, 421.
6 Justice Powell, disagreeing with the Brennan Four, found that the Davis
program violated constitutional standards. Accordingly, he voted with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens to form the majority
holding the Davis program unlawful. Id. 271. Justice Powell voted with Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun to form the majority holding that it is
not always unlawful to consider race in an admissions program. Id. 272.
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to be found in his position; section III considers what he would
require of minority-admissions programs.
II. THE AUTHORITATIVENESS OF THE POWELL PosmioN

It was understandable that the immediate reaction of many
to the Bakke decision was to find "the law" in the views of Justice
Powell. He not only announced the judgment of the Court, but
provided the "swing" votes and was therefore the only Justice whose
position paralleled the actual disposition of the litigation between
Mr. Bakke and the University of California Medical School at
Davis. By combining the opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens,
the proponents of this view argue that five members of the Court
announced views which hold at least that a minority-admissions
plan failing to meet Justice Powell's constitutional standards violates Title VI. In making this argument, these commentators
are not predicting how the Justices will vote in future litigation;
rather they are contending that this rule commands normative force.
It is important to recognize that, although this initial view
persists in legal as well as popular discussions, and indeed is held
by many law teachers,7 it rests on premises plainly open to reasonable debate and dispute. As the Report of the American Council
on Education and the Association of American Law Schools Committee on Bakke concluded:
Justice Powell... addressed only two of the many possible
approaches to race-conscious admissions. Moreover, four
members of the Court did not address the issue of the permissible use of race under the Constitution, while four
others believe that the Constitution would permit more
extensive use of race than did Justice Powell. . . . No
Justice concurred in the Powell discussion of permissible
and impermissible purposes. Under the circumstances,
it is not at all clear what might be the result if the Court
were faced with a slightly different admission plan or a
similar plan under different circumstances."
The conclusion that Justice Powell's views express the minimum standards of legality for a minority-admissions program under.
For a carefully reasoned conclusion to this effect, see Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REv. 21, 23-24, 30
(1979). For a casual assumption of a similar conclusion, see Posner, The Bakke
Case and the Future of Affirmative Action, 67 CAL. L. REv. 171, 177-78 & n.20
(1979).
8 Az wcAN CouNcIL ox EDUCATION and ASSocr&TON or AMEuCAN LAW
SCHOOLS, THE BAKE DECISION: ImPLICATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ADmISSIONS

17 (1978).
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Title VI depends on the truth of three propositions. First, it is
contended that, since Justice Powell read Title VI to condemn
admissions arrangements violative of the Constitution, and since he
went on to hold that the Davis program did violate the fourteenth
amendment, he necessarily held that it violated the statute as well.
Second, the opinion by Justice Stevens is read to hold that Title VI
mandates a "colorblind" approach, and that all race-conscious programs are therefore unlawful under it. Finally, it is asserted that
those Justices joining the Stevens opinion may still claim normative
power for its view of the statute, because the five Justices rejecting it
do not themselves agree on the proper reading of Title VI (that is,
although all five agree that the question under the statute turns on
the meaning of the equal protection clause, they differ as to that
meaning).9 Until one or more of these propositions proves false
in future litigation, so the argument runs, any program not meeting
Justice Powell's criteria for constitutionality violates the statute.
It is clear that the foregoing position is logically tenable. It is
no less clear that, at each point, it chooses to regard as not controlling significant factors which point another way, and that the issue
whether those factors are to be controlling is one on which the
Court itself has not spoken.
To begin with the Stevens opinion, although the interpretation
described above surely draws support from the content of Justice
Stevens's discussion of Title VI, it chooses to give no substantial
weight to the observation he was at pains to emphasize at the outset
-that the issue before the Court concerned only the Davis minorityadmissions program and, indeed, only involved it to the extent that
it affected the processing of Bakke's own application. "[T]here is
no outstanding injunction forbidding any consideration of racial
criteria in processing applications," 10 Justice Stevens emphasized,
and argued that it was "therefore perfectly clear that the question
whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision
is not an issue in this case, and that discussion of that issue is inappropriate." 11 Many find it difficult to reconcile Justice Stevens's
concern for confining the reach of his opinion with the apparently
broader implications of his substantive discussion-in particular,
his omission to refer to any specific failing of the Davis program
9 Justice Powell's view of the constitutional issue is discussed below, see section

III infra; for the approach of the Brennan Four, see Greenawalt, The Unresolved
Problems of Reverse Discrimination,67 C~AL. L. REv. 87, 110-17 (1979).
lo Bakke, 438 U.S. at 411.
11d.
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other than race-consciousness itself. It may be that race-conscious
programs would be permissible under Title VI, according to the
Stevens view, where "regular" programs are thought or found to
have a discriminatory purpose or effect. In any event, it is ultimately for Justice Stevens-and for each of the Justices joining his
opinion-to find the proper basis for integrating its two branches,
or failing in the attempt, to choose whether to discard the one or
narrow the other. For the present, nothing more can be known
than that there is more than one sensible way to read their position.'

2

Second, it is of course possible that each of the four Justices
joining the Stevens opinion will believe that the matter of the
proper meaning of Title VI is sufficiently clouded, by reason of the
disagreement between Justice Powell and the four remaining Justices over the content of the constitutional norms involved, to warrant his continuing to take a view of the statute rejected by five
of his colleagues. It is, however, impossible to read the opinions
as a whole without observing that the statutory issue was viewed by
the entire Court in dilemmatic, fairly abstract terms: whether Title
VI embodied constitutional norms, or went beyond them. Put that
way, the issue was squarely resolved in favor of the narrower position by a five-Justice majority.'3 In those circumstances, it is surely
not unreasonable to regard the statutory question as behind us, and
view future litigation as turning solely on the proper construction
of the fourteenth amendment.
Finally, although in one sense it is logically deducible from
Justice Powell's opinion that he would hold Title VI violated by a
program which he viewed as unconstitutional, it would have been
impossible for him to join a holding that the medical school was
12 Indeed, Justice Stewart, one of the Stevens Four, recently joined the opinion
of the Court, per Justice Brennan, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979), which refused to construe Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1977), to prohibit all race-conscious programs to
which it applied. (Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.) Plaintiff's
proffered reading of Title VII was similar to the broader reading of Title VI which
some find taken in the Stevens opinion in Bakke, and was rejected by the Court
as inconsistent with the perceived dominant legislative purpose to open opportunities for racial minorities. Voluntary race-conscious programs serving this purpose,
which do not "unnecessarily trammel the interests" of whites, 99 S. Ct. at 2730,
were held lawful. While there are many differences in purposes and scope between Title VII and Title VI, see id. 2729 n.6, so that the criteria of legality
adopted might differ under the two provisions, the view of the dominant legislative
purpose which animated the Weber Court's rejection of a "color-blind" approach to
Title VII seems to apply to Title VI as well.

'3 See note 5 supra.
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liable under Title VI, without resolving the jurisdictional issue of
Bakke's right to maintain an action under the statute. 14 Indeed,
although the trial court specifically found in Bakke's favor on
statutory as well as constitutional grounds, 15 Justice Powell's vote
to affirm was carefully applied only to that portion of the judgment
invalidating the program under the Constitution.' 6 While there is
much force to the assertion that universities receiving federal financial support should not take advantage of the possibility that the
Court may ultimately deny the existence of a private right of action,
but should obey the substance of the statutory mandate once it is
authoritatively construed by the Court, it is ironic to see that principle advanced in this context, where a majority of the Court has
squarely rejected the contention that Title VI goes beyond constitutional norms, and four of the five Justices who discuss constitutional norms have adopted a position permitting much which
Justice Powell's position would proscribe.
The point of recognizing that there are competing interpretations of Bakke is not to enable a school to choose a "correct" interpretation. Law schools are not being asked to decide a case which
will interpret and clarify Bahke, but to consider the extent of their
own discretion under Bakke to do as wise educational policy seems
to lead. The need in such a context is to recognize that tenable
choices are available, and that those who insist that the Powell
opinion has normative authoritativeness have chosen to take a broad
reading of his and Justice Stevens's opinions at several critical points.
They are of course free to do that, but others are equally free,
morally and legally, to choose narrower interpretations. The critical issues remain ones of educational policy, including each university's own sense of fairness in dealing with the competing interests.
Those seeking to restrict minority-admissions programs should meet
the issues of policy thereby raised. They should not seek to insulate
their views on the merits of those issues by an appeal to respect for
law and the Supreme Court.
' 4justice Powell (like Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) concluded
that it was unnecessary to decide whether Title VI confers a private cause of action.
Balcke, 438 U.S. at 283 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. 328 (opinion of the Brennan

Four). Justice White decided that Title VI contained no such right of action, id.
379-87, and the Justices joining the Stevens opinion, while asserting that the question of the availability of a private right of action under Title VI was not properly
before the Court, id. 419, indicated that they would infer a private right of action

under the statute, see id. 419 & n.25, 420 & nn.27 & 28.
15 Id. 270.
16 Id. 320.
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III. THE

REQUIREMENTS OF THE POWELL

POSITION

It does not detract from the analysis in the preceding section to
agree that Justice Powell's views are entitled to the most careful
attention and deference and, indeed, that they may claim controlling force when that can be given them without compromising
important educational values. Accordingly, this section addresses
the question: What kinds of race-conscious programs would be
deemed constitutional according to the norms espoused in the
Powell opinion? The following discussion attempts to discern,
articulate, and apply the premises and priorities of that opinion conscientiously, even where they seem troublesome on one or another
ground. To those sharply critical of the Powell analysis, it may
be disturbing for its lack of critical evaluation; to those strongly
hostile to race-conscious admissions programs, it may be thought
simply a product of disagreement with the Justice. I believe that I
have applied Justice Powell's norms in a fair-minded and conscientious way, and hope that most readers will agree.
The key to Justice Powell's approach is individual competitive
considerationfor all applicants.17 Each applicant must theoretically
be able to compete for every open place. The race of a minority
applicant is a factor which may be weighed against other factors in
determining relative admissibility, but no commitment to a particular racial goal will normally be permitted to insulate any successful applicant from that competitive inquiry.
It is useful to consider the specifics of the Powell approach in
the context of particular issues in the administration of a minorityadmissions program. These typically involve the numerical target
involved; the administration of the program by a separate committee or sub-committee, to which some members may be appointed
on a racial or ethnic basis; and the educational or societal objectives
which shape a school's program.
A. Numerical Targets, Goals, and Quotas
Justice Powell expressly permits the overt consideration of race
as a factor in admissions decisions,' 8 yet he rejects the University
of California's reliance, in its attempt to draw a legal distinction
between "goals" and "quotas," on the asserted fact that the sixteen
seats in question would only have been filled with minority appli171 am indebted to my colleague on the SALT Board of Governors, Professor Robert A. Sedler, Wayne State University Law School, for this phraseology.
18 Id. 320.
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cants if enough were available who met an absolute standard of
qualification. 19 His reason for such rejection is that, even where a
minimum-qualification requirement exists, as long as it is satisfied,
"white applicants could compete only for eighty-four seats in the
entering class, rather than the one hundred open to minority applicants." 20 This is significant to Justice Powell because it is not
enough to look simply at the strength of the case for admitting a
minority applicant, as the "minimum qualification" requirement
does. There must be some examination as well of the relative
strength of the claim of non-minority applicants at the margin of
admissibility. The reason that the "Harvard model" is constitutionally different from the Davis program is that in the former case
"race or ethnic background . . .does not insulate the individual
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." 21
"The denial to [Bakke] of this right to individualized consideration
without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner's special
admissions program." 22
This reasoning entails an important limitation on the permissibility of a numerical target. No less important is the need to
recognize that the limitation is itself quite limited in its thrust.
As already noted, it in no way suggests that there is anything illicit
about an avowed use of race in determining relative admissibility.
It does not even prohibit the setting of a numerical target or goal,
as long as a program that includes such a goal is administered so that
the comparative evaluation referred to can be carried out. It therefore remains perfectly legitimate for a faculty to announce the hope
or expectation-even the presumptive belief, based on prior years'
experience-that a given number or range of minority applicants
will be admitted, provided that before the least strong members of
that group are admitted there is a genuine examination of their
relative desirability as against the strongest group of non-minority
applicants whose claim to the seats in question is at stake.
In prescribing a determination of relative admissibility, Justice
Powell does not preempt the discretion of each university to decide
for itself how much weight a particular institution, in a particular
time and place, will give to any particular factor, whether race or
ethnic background or (to use his catalogue) "exceptional personal
talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential,
19 Id. 288 & n.26, 289.
20 Id. 289.
21 Id. 317.
22Id. 318 n.52.

WHAT BAXKE REQUIRES OF LAW SCHOOLS

maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications." 2 As the Justice says:
In short, an admissions program operated in this way is
flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the
same weight. Indeed, the weight attributed to a particular
quality may vary from year to year depending upon the
"mix" both of the student body and the applicants for
the incoming class.
This kind of program treats each applicant as an
individual in the admissions process. The applicant who
loses out on the last available seat to another candidate
receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will
not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that
seat simply because he was not the right color or had the
wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined
qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant.
His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and
competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendent.24
Thus, a university remains free to set a numerical target and
to use its own discretion in judging the comparative claims of the
least strong candidates admitted under a minority-admissions program against the claims of the most attractive unsuccessful nonminority applicants, as long as it carries out that process in a
timely and fair manner during each admissions cycle. Any broader
reading of the Powell discussion of numerical goals would go beyond his expressed concern-individual consideration for all-and
would fail to give weight to his espousal of the legitimacy of the
consideration of race and to his expressions of deference to uni25
versity discretion in setting admissions policy.
The issue will doubtless arise, how many minority and nonminority applicants must be weighed comparatively. There is
23

Id. 317.

24

Id. 317-18.

25 Id. 315-19.

A Policy Interpretation recently issued by HEW in light of

Bakke asserts that a university may determine the "relative weight" to be given race
and other discretionary factors, and specifically approves a decision to give race
"greater weight" than others. 44 Fed. Beg. 58509, 58510 (1979).
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clearly no requirement that each minority applicant accepted be so
examined. Indeed, taken literally, Justice Powell's opinion says
that a comparison of only one applicant in each group is needed:,
"the last available seat." 26 This of course refers to the one minority
applicant who is ranked lowest among others, yet is judged preferable
to the one non-minority applicant ranked highest among the unaccepted non-minority applicants. Many schools will not want to
make such precise gradations, and would accordingly need to compare a few of each group. If the lowest-rated group of minority
applicants whose admission is being favorably considered is compared with the highest-rated group of non-minority applicants who
are likely to be rejected, and one or more of the former is deemed
preferable, the job is done. A school need not compare all of the
minority applicants directly to the non-minority group because it
can assume that all other accepted minority applicants (and rejected
non-minority applicants) present cases which are a fortiori. Of
course, if on a comparative evaluation of a few from each group, all
of the minority contenders are rejected, the next-lower-rated group
of non-minority applicants is entitled to a comparative examination
against the next-higher-rated minority applicants.
B. The Separate Minority-Admissions Committee
Justice Powell does not discuss explicitly the legitimacy of the
widespread use of a separate committee to administer a race-conscious program. Nonetheless, many have asserted that the rationale
of his approach is inconsistent with such a committee. Here too,
it is as easy to overstate the Powell position as to understate it:
While his concerns require significant safeguards in the administration of a separate-committee process, they do not provide a basis
for asserting that such a process is invalid per se.
The discussion above regarding individual competitive consideration for all provides the touchstone for analysis here. A
separate committee may not administer a race-conscious program
without consulting with those who administer the processing of nonminority applicants, for if there were no such contact at least once
in every admissions cycle the admissions process would lack the
comparative weighing which is critical to Justice Powell; a separate
committee could only evaluate absolute admissibility and relative
strength from within the "special" admissions group, and that is insufficient. There is no reason, however, to regard the choice of the
particular manner by which the overall comparison is made as
26 Id. 318.
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beyond the law school's discretion. A separate sub-committee
operating within the framework of a single admissions committee is
certainly one way of doing this work. There is nothing of constitutional moment, given Justice Powell's analysis, in the subcommittee-parent arrangement. The two groups could work as separate
committees, as long as there was adequate provision for their deliberating together when the time came to make the final comparative judgments. Indeed, it would be wrong to assume, when Justice
Powell says nothing to require the assumption, that the ultimate
decision must be one which is left to the "regular" committee. As
long as the job of comparative evaluation is in fact carried out in a
timely and fair manner, Justice Powell's opinion provides no warrant to suggest that individuals chosen to do that work on the basis
of any factor which seems sensible to a school-including, as is often
the case with student members, their own racial or ethnic identification-are constitutionally disqualified from participating in it, or
are constitutionally relegated to an advocate's or advisor's role. It
is the substance of the comparative evaluation, and not the particular form by which it is made, which is of constitutional import. The
form should be decided by each school on the basis of its own perceived needs and priorities, unencumbered by any assertions of legal
mandate other than the good faith which Justice Powell requires
27
and presumes.
C. Program Objectives: Diversity and Others
The final issue is that of permissible and impermissible objectives in the shaping of a program. It is probably true that for many
teachers the interest in a diverse student body has been a far less
significant factor in individual and faculty decisions to initiate and
28
shape a race-conscious program than have been other objectives.
These other goals the Powell opinion found insufficient in the Davis
litigation. The question therefore arises whether diversity is the
only licit objective which a school may consider in light of Bakke.
For if the major determinants are to be judgments of educational
policy, but certain objectives must be abandoned, a conscientious
faculty might well decide to cut back its program, or give far less
weight to one or another factor which has shaped its administra271d. 318-19 & n.53.

28 Cf. Henidn, What of the Right to Practice a Profession?, 67 CAL. L. REV.
131 (1979) (criticizing the decision in Bakke for emphasizing educational goals as
the relevant area of state interest, rather than examining the interests affecting
individual and group access to membership in the legal profession).
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tion. Accordingly, it is important to address the question of the
circumstances under which, according to Justice Powell, particular
objectives may be sought and what their content may be.
First, as to diversity itself: It bears repeating that Justice Powell
does not hold that a university must value all forms of diversity
equally, or to any particular degree. Many have expressed surprise
at Justice Powell's rather casual assertion that the Constitution mandates a particular form of diversity as educationally justifiable. 29
The apparent basis for Justice Powell's insistence that the Constitution intrudes on academic discretion to the extent of forbidding an
interest in diversity which is limited to racial or ethnic minorities
lies in his perception of the concerns and reach of the fourteenth
amendment.8 0 As a result of these concerns, he evidently feels justified in requiring a commitment to a broader form of diversity,
one which affords all applicants the opportunity to have considered
the strength of their individual contributions, "including their own
potential for contribution to educational diversity." 81 But, as
noted above, it is another matter entirely to read in this requirement any desire to require a university to assert any particular
degree of commitment to specific kinds of diversity, as long as there
is sufficient open-mindedness to give fair consideration to other
types of claims.
To many, a far more significant social-educational goal supporting race-conscious programs in law school is the desire to contribute, through that means, to ameliorating the extreme relative
unavailability of legal representation to members of racial and
ethnic minorities. It is essential to bear in mind that Justice Powell
does not cast doubt on the constitutional validity of this objective.
(In Bakke, of course, the objective concerned medical rather than
legal services.) He rested entirely on the position that a university
must bear the burden of showing in litigation that its program is
"needed [and] geared to promote that goal." 32 Any faculty which
29 Justice Powell states that:

the nature of the state interest that would justify consideration of race or
ethnic background . . . is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity ....
The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather
than further attainment of genuine diversity.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (emphasis in original).
30 See Justice Powell's discussion of the suspect quality of racial and ethnic
distinctions, id. 291-99.
31 Id. 319.
.321d. 310.
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believes that its program is so needed and so geared is in no way
evading Justice Powell's mandate in continuing to permit such an
objective to shape the admissions process. Particularly in light of
the way Bakke was tried, 8 the failure of that record to meet this
need hardly bespeaks an inability to do so in the future. Indeed,
in this connection it is extremely relevant that the Association of
American Law Schools, the American Bar Association, and others
all took the position amicus that the relationship in question does
in fact exist. While Justice Powell rejected the adequacy of that
form of making such a showing, the result is simply to transfer the
question to future cases and to the proof rather than the argument
stage. Again, differences among us as to the wisdom of that result
should not lead us to overstate its significance.
A third objective, and one which again has probably played a
major role in shaping many programs, is the desire to offset historic
patterns of societal discrimination, and more specifically to prevent
the use of standard admissions criteria from reenforcing the effects
of historic discrimination. Here, the conclusion that Justice Powell
rejects the adequacy of such an interest finds rational support in his
insistence on legislative, judicial, or administrative findings both of
particular discrimination by specific schools and of the equity of a
specific race-conscious program as a remedy for concrete wrongful
acts.84 Even here, however, the Powell position may have a narrower reach than many attribute to it. First, the opinion does not
at all address the question what options are available to a faculty
which honestly believes that there has been actual past discriminatory conduct at its school. Were a rejected minority applicant to
bring a suit which came to judgment before a Bakke-type suit, there
might well be the remedial predicate upon which Justice Powell
insists. It seems bizarre to say that a faculty may not consider the
vulnerability of its institution to such a suit in structuring a program.35 This issue would be particularly poignant in any school in
33
S ee Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. Rnv. 3, 4-7 (1979); Smith, Reflections on a Landmark, 21 How.
LJ.72, 77-79 (1978).

8

4See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10.

35 Compare the perceptions of Justices Brennan and B]ackmun in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979): "It would be ironic indeed
if a law [Title VII] triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice... constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, raceconscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy,"
id. 2728, (opinion of the Court per Brennan, J.); "[it] would be 'ironic, given the
broad remedial purposes of Title VII," to interpret the statute to "lock in" the effects
of past segregation, id. 2733, (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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which such a suit was actually pending when its program was
adopted.
More broadly, Justice Powell does not wholly close the door
on the legitimacy of a school's departing from its normal standards
because of its concern that they would be regarded as discriminatory
in the objective sense that their disparate racial impact is not justified by their predictive validity in judging among qualified applicants. He rejects this contention in Bakke in substantial part on
the ground that there was nothing in the record below suggesting
that any disparate impact "is without educational justification." 36
Accepting the evident holding that the burden here rests on those
defending the program to show the lack of educational justification
for the school's normal standards, it may well remain open to a
school to act on a belief that such justification is in fact lacking, and
to stand prepared to support that conclusion in litigation, much as
Justice Powell plainly permits with respect to demonstrating the
minority community's need for more minority lawyers. Again,
whatever one might think of the wisdom of having this issue litigated in individual suits, Justice Powell clearly elected to require
37
that method.
IV. SUMMARY

First, a university which desires to operate a race-conscious
admissions program not meeting Mr. Justice Powell's criteria has a
sufficient legal basis for doing so.
a) Stated as requisites of constitutionality, the Powell criteria
have been rejected by every Justice who has considered the question.
b) The conclusion that the Powell criteria represent conditions
of lawfulness which a majority of the Supreme Court has found to
3

6Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 n.44.

37Some will read the whole of Justice Powell's note 44, 438 U.S. at 308 n.44,

more broadly, either to require as well that the university be prepared to prove in
court that the disparate impact was the product of discrimination, or to reject the sufficiency of "disparate impact" analysis in Title VI litigation altogether. The requirement of the first of these broader readings is one which a faculty might think could
readily be met in litigation, cf. Justice Blackmun's observation in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2732 n.* (1979) (concurring opinion) (underrepresentation of blacks in the craft work force did stem from "purposeful discrimination in the past"). The second broad reading of note 44 would
reject the legitimacy of any proof which might be offered. Whatever is ultimately
said further about note 44, the issue can hardly be thought at present to have

been resolved with clarity and finality. The recent HEW Policy Interpretation reads
Bakke to permit a university which has not discriminated to act to "overcome the
effects of conditions which resulted in limiting [minority] participation .... ..

44 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58511 (1979).
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be necessary under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 rests
on a judgment to disregard all of the following aspects of the Bakke
opinions:
(1) Justice Stevens specifically disclaims any judgment regarding the general legitimacy of race-conscious programs.
(2) The Justices joining the Stevens opinion voted as they
did on a view of Title VI as independent of constitutional
norms, a view now squarely rejected by a majority of the
Court.
(3) Justice Powell himself has not resolved a questionthe existence of a private right of action under Title VI-which
is anterior to his joining any majority to hold a program in
violation of the statute.
While a conclusion to disregard all these factors is permissible, it is
not required by a conscientious fair-minded reading of the Bakke
opinions or by relevant ethical or prudential considerations.
Second, a university which elects to structure its law-school
admissions program to meet Justice Powell's criteria of constitutionality may act as follows:
a) Race or ethnic identity may be overtly employed as a factor
enhancing the relative admissibility of minority applicants, provided that such admissibility is not determined merely according
to an absolute measure of qualification or by a comparative ranking
of minority applicants against one another, but includes an evaluation of the relative qualifications (judged by the school's criteria)
of the lowest-ranked group of favorably considered minority applicants and the highest-ranked group of unfavorably considered
non-minority applicants.
b) A specific numerical objective for minimum minority-student membership in the entering class may be employed as a guideline or goal for those administering the program, provided that
neither the size of the number chosen nor the strength of the desire
not to depart from it impairs the ability of those administering the
program to carry out in good faith the comparative evaluation
required.
c) A law school may employ a committee to which members
are assigned on the basis of their racial or ethnic identification to
administer a minority-admissions program, provided that the required comparative evaluation is made. As long as that compara-
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tive evaluation can be and is carried out in a fair and timely way, a
school may structure the relation between the processing of minority
and non-minority applicants, including the existence and respective
roles of separate committees, as it wishes.
d) In considering the educational or societal goals which a
race-conscious program is intended to serve, a law school:
(1) may not pursue the goal of diversity by a consideration
of racial or ethnic diversity alone, but may pursue those forms
of diversity along with others, and in doing so may choose
which other aspects of diversity to value and to what degree;
(2) may seek to ameliorate the relative unavailability of
legal representation to members of minority groups only if it
is prepared to establish in any litigation that its program is
necessary and useful to meet that objective;
(3) may seek to offset, or avoid reenforcing, historic patterns of societal discrimination only if-and here, the contours
of the "only" are least clear-it is prepared to establish in any
litigation that purposeful discrimination existed at the particular school involved or that the "regular" criteria of admissibility have a disparate racial impact (perhaps one attributable to societal discrimination) and are lacking in predictive or
other educational justification.

